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This report is the deliverable of the task ‘Fire PRA’ (T1.2) of the project of ‘New Development 
and applications of PRA’ (NAPRA) on 2020.  
 
The goal of NAPRA T1.2 is to apply simulation-based event trees to model fire scenarios in 
order to make fire PRA more realistic. This report presents the results of the year 2020. 
 
The project is part of SAFIR2022 research programme, funded by VYR. The work was 
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Deterministic fire hazard analyses, investigations of the operating experience at nuclear 
installations and fire probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) (OECD 2015) have demonstrated that 
knowledge of the frequency of the occurrence of fires is an important contributor to nuclear 
power plant (NPP) fire risk assessment. However, fires and associated plant responses are 
complex phenomena, and therefore the estimates of fire risk are subject to considerable 
uncertainty. Fire PRA has often been characterized as being less mature and less realistic 
than other internal events PRA. Perceptions of immaturity can affect stakeholders’ use of fire 
PRA information. Unrealistic fire PRA results could affect fire-safety related decisions and 
improperly skew comparisons of risk contributions from different hazards (Siu & Sancaktar 
2015). Modelling the firefighting defence-in-depth including human actions can be used to 
reduce conservatism by taking into account the possibility of preventing the damages of critical 
components and failures of safety functions in a fire situation. Attempts of this kind of an 
approach have earlier been made by e.g. (Hostikka et al. 2012a), (Kloos et al. 2014) and 
(Sakurahara et al. 2018), but practicality of the method still needs further development. 
One of the main limitations of the generally used fire PRA methodology is that it is not capable 
of adequately accounting for the dynamic behaviour and effects of fire due to its reliance on 
the classical PRA methodology i.e. event trees and fault trees (Sakurahara et al. 2014). In this 
study, simulation-based event trees of FinPSA software (Tyrväinen et al. 2016; VTT 2020) are 
used to model a cable room fire scenario. The aim is to develop an approach for more realistic 
fire PRA. Simulation-based event trees are particularly useful to model impacts of time delays 
and dynamic dependencies, such as how the time available for fire brigade to arrive depends 
on the progression of the fire itself, which contains significant uncertainties. 
This report continues the work presented in (Tyrväinen et al. 2020). In (Tyrväinen et al. 2020), 
the NPP cable room fire analysis scenario from (Hostikka et al. 2012a) was implemented in a 
simulation-based event tree of FinPSA. The main components of the model are Monte Carlo 
fire simulations and a stochastic operation time model for firefighting. The fire simulations were 
performed separately using deterministic Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) (McGrattan et al. 
2013), and the results of the simulations were imported to FinPSA. The so-called “stochastic 
operation time model” was implemented in FinPSA scripts in eight parts corresponding to 
different operational phases, including fire detection, guard centre actions, control room 
actions and fire brigade actions. 
The objectives of this work are: 
 to explore more dependencies between the fire brigade actions and fire progression. 
 to identify uncertainties related to the cable room fire analysis. 
 to study the reliability of the automatic suppression system. 
 to consider other fire scenarios in order to extend the modelling approach. 
2. Simulation-based event trees 
PRA software FinPSA (VTT 2020) includes a module for simulation-based event trees. The 
module has been developed for probabilistic analysis of severe nuclear reactor accidents 
(Tyrväinen et al. 2016, Tyrväinen & Karanta 2019), but it is, in practise, a general-purpose 
probabilistic risk analysis tool. The module combines event trees with computation scripts 
written using FinPSA’s own programming language, so-called “containment event tree 
language” (CETL). In the script files, the user defines functions that calculate probabilities of 
 
 





event tree branches and possibly other variable values, such as amounts of consequences or 
timings of events. The script files enable the use of various different modelling approaches, 
because contents of the scripts are not limited in any way, except that they must conform to 
the CETL syntax. 
The model includes a separate script file for each event tree section, for an initial section, and 
for a common section, which is common to all event trees in the project if there are multiple 
event trees. A function name is assigned to each event tree branch, and the function has to be 
defined in the script file of the corresponding event tree section. The function returns the 
probability of the event tree branch. It is also possible to write other functions that are called 
e.g. by branch functions. The model can include both global variables and local variables 
limited for a specific event tree section. Normal variable types, such as ‘real’, ‘integer’, 
‘Boolean’ and ‘string’, can be used. Distributions of few different types can also be specified. 
A set of built-in functions is available, including some distribution operations. 
To account for uncertainties related to variable values, it is possible to specify probability 
distributions for parameters and perform Monte Carlo simulations. At each simulation cycle, a 
value is sampled from each specified distribution, and based on that, numerical conditional 
probabilities are calculated for all event tree branches. Values are calculated for all variables 
at each end point of the event tree. After the simulations, statistical analyses are performed 
automatically to calculate frequency and variable value distributions for each end point among 
other statistical results and correlation analyses. It is also possible just to calculate point values 
of the event tree based on the mean values of distributions. Event tree sequences can also be 
grouped by a binner routine, and combined results can be calculated for the specified 
consequence categories. 
3. Cable fire case study 
3.1 The original case study 
The NPP cable room fire case study presented here was originally presented in (Hostikka et 
al. 2012a). The analysed cable room contains both power and I&C cables of two redundant 
subsystems (B and D). The cables of the subsystems are physically separated in a multi-level 
metallic cable tray system. In the places where the cables of different subsystems are close to 
each other, mechanical shield plates have been installed between the cable trays. The cables 
are the primary fire load in the room, and the power cables are the most probable source of 
ignition. In this study, the ignition is assumed to occur in the power cables of subsystem B, and 
the analysis aims to estimate the probability of cable failure in subsystem D. 
The original analysis was performed using PFS, i.e. Probabilistic Fire Simulator (Hostikka & 
Keski-Rahkonen 2003; Hostikka 2008), and FDS, i.e. Fire Dynamics Simulator (McGrattan et 
al. 2013). PFS is an Excel tool that uses VisualBasic macros and dll libraries. PFS generated 
the simulation cases using Latin hypercube sampling based on given random variables, 
created the input files for FDS, managed the simulation runs and performed the post-
processing of simulation results automatically. The random variables included the location of 
the initial fire, the size of the initial fire, properties of power cables and concrete, and the 
response of the sprinkler system (if working). PFS also performed stochastic operation time 
simulations of firefighting operations. For each simulation point, it was checked whether the 
fire brigade was able to suppress the fire before the cable damage. In addition, it was checked 
whether the firefighting conditions were tolerable when the fire brigade arrived to the room. 
The stochastic operation time simulations were performed using random number sampling 
functions of Excel. 
 
 





3.2 Operation time model 
The time delays of the operation time model were related to fire detection, control room 
operations and fire brigade operations. The simulation model includes eight phases: 
1. Detection 
There is a delay between the ignition and the detection. Detection can take place 
through smoke detectors and an automatic alarm system, sprinklers, or through the 
human senses. 
2. Alarm 
The information about the detection is transmitted to the security centre and the 
control room of the NPP as well as to the Emergency Response Centre. The fire 
brigade receives the information via an alarm system and by phone. 
3. Fire brigade response 
After the alarm the fire brigade leaves the fire station and moves to the destination.  
4. Fire brigade clearance to the building entrance 
The first assessment of the situation, the unit manager's instructions, and the 
transition to the front door. 
5. Fire brigade arrival at the room of origin of fire 
Finding the destination, moving there and pressurizing the hoses. 
6. Co-operation with the plant personnel 
Collaboration is needed between the fire department and the control room. Fire 
brigade will check the situation and possibly ask for voltage cut-off in the room of 
origin. 
7. (Possibly) Voltage cut-off for the safety of the fire brigade using water-based 
suppression 
The operator performs the necessary actions from the control room. 
8. Systematic search 
Systematic search with thermal imaging. Extinguish the fire when it is found. 
Most of the phases consist of multiple actions, and the model includes possible additional time 
delays caused by human errors and equipment failures. The operational actions are illustrated 
in Figure 1. After the fire is detected, the control room calls the guard centre, which alarms the 
fire brigade. There are parallel actions related to control room personnel and arrival of the fire 
brigade. The control room sends a person to confirm that there is a fire. When the fire brigade 
arrives, the control room and the fire brigade need to co-operate, and the control room 
personnel may need to cut-off the voltage before the fire brigade can enter the room and 
suppress the fire. 
 
 






Figure 1: The operational actions related to firefighting (Hostikka et al. 2012a). 
The total operation time delay from the ignition to the suppression is calculated as 
∆𝑡𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅 = ∆𝑡𝐷𝐸𝑇 +max[∆𝑡𝐶𝑅, (∆𝑡𝐺𝐶 + ∆𝑡𝐹𝐵,1 + ∆𝑡𝐹𝐵,2 + ∆𝑡𝐹𝐵,3)] + ∆𝑡𝐶𝑂 + ∆𝑡𝑉 + ∆𝑡𝐹𝐵,4, 
where ∆𝑡𝐷𝐸𝑇 is the delay from the ignition to the detection, ∆𝑡𝐶𝑅 is the time it takes for the 
control room to confirm the fire and perform other preparations before co-operating with the 
fire brigade, ∆𝑡𝐺𝐶 is the time it takes for the guard centre to alarm the fire brigade, ∆𝑡𝐹𝐵,1 is the 
fire brigade response time, ∆𝑡𝐹𝐵,2 is the fire brigade clearing time to the building entrance, 
∆𝑡𝐹𝐵,3 is the travel time from the building entrance to the room where the fire is located, ∆𝑡𝐶𝑂 
is the delay related to the co-operation between the fire brigade and the control room, ∆𝑡𝑉 is 
the time it takes to cut-off the voltage, and ∆𝑡𝐹𝐵,4 is the time it takes to find and extinguish the 
fire. 
The details of the stochastic operation time model are presented in (Hostikka et al. 2012a), 
(Kling 2010) and (Tyrväinen et al. 2020). 
3.3 Simulation-based event tree model 
In (Tyrväinen et al. 2020), the case study was implemented in a simulation-based event tree 
of FinPSA. The event tree model is presented in Figure 2. The fire simulation results from FDS 
were imported to FinPSA scripts as vectors. Values of three variables were imported: the 
detection time, cable damage time and time when the firefighting conditions become 
intolerable. The operation time model was implemented in FinPSA scripts completely in eight 
sections according to the operation phases. 
 
 






Figure 2: Event tree with operation time model. 
The details of the model are presented in (Tyrväinen et al. 2020). As an example, the scripts 
related to the guard centre are the following: 
real p_anf, p_wa, r_anf, r_wa, r_wi, t_mca, t_cud, t_wa 
 
routine init 
  p_anf = raneven(0.01,0.05) $ Auto-notification failure probability 
  p_wa = raneven(0.01,0.05)  $ Probability of wrong address 
  p_wi = raneven(0.01,0.05)  $ Probability of wrong interpretation of the alarm 
 
  t_mca = raneven(0.1,0.5)   $ Making a collective alarm 
  t_cud = raneven(1,1.5)     $ Calling the unit director 
  t_wa = raneven(2,10)       $ Wrong address 
  t_aso = raneven(0.5,5)     $ Alarm set-off 
  t_wi = raneven(1,10)       $ Wrong interpretation of the alarm 
  t_cgc = raneven(0.5,2)     $ Call to the guard centre 
 
  r_anf = random() 
  r_wa = random() 




function nil GC 
  $ Guard centre operation time is determined 
  t_gc = t_mca+t_cud 
   
  if r_anf < p_anf then 
  begin 
    t_gc = t_gc+t_aso+t_cgc 
    if r_wi < p_wi then t_gc = t_gc+t_wi 
  end 
   
  if r_wa < p_wa then t_gc = t_gc+t_wa 
return nil 
In the final section of the event tree, the operation time from the detection to the beginning of 
the systematic search is calculated. Then, for each fire simulation cycle, it is checked whether 
the cable failure occurs before the suppression, and whether the room conditions are such that 
the fire brigade can enter the room when they are ready. In other words, for each fire 
simulation, it is determined whether the fire brigade is in time or not. The probability of a cable 










4. Dependencies between the fire brigade actions and fire 
progression 
The original case study was performed using Probabilistic Fire Simulator (PFS) (Hostikka & 
Keski-Rahkonen 2003; Hostikka 2008), which managed the Monte Carlo fire simulation. PFS 
generated the simulation cases using Latin hypercube sampling based on given random 
variables, created the input files for FDS, managed the simulation runs and performed the 
post-processing of simulation results automatically. The random variables included the location 
of the initial fire, the size of the initial fire, properties of power cables and concrete, and the 
response of the sprinkler system (if working). Also the dependencies of the target outcomes 
on the random input parameters were readily obtained, e.g., PFS calculates automatically 
correlation coefficients and it can be used to present the results as histograms. 
For each simulation, it was studied when the temperature of the insulating material around the 
metal wires reaches the critical temperature. The results included also smoke detector alarm 
time for each simulation. In the old fire simulations and in the analysis thereafter some 
sensitivities of chosen values and/or modelling choices were not examined. For example, 
these include: How much smoke/temperature/radiation is able to block fire brigade operations 
at the doors and at what level (meters above floor) this smoke/temperature/radiation criteria is 
observed. 
Therefore, the properties of the Monte Carlo fire simulation data have been analysed in more 
detail. The study concentrates on the simulations without the sprinkler system, because in the 
simulations the sprinkler system was able to prevent the cable failure when it was working. 
This analysis was started by Tyrväinen et al. (2020) and it was noted and concluded that: 
 The fires can be classified to be small or large fires. About 40 % of the fires released 
less than about 1 GJ of energy and a little more than 50 % release more than 10 GJ. 
These fires represent different type of fires. Small fires are local fires that do not 
spread, whereas the large fires represent cable fires that spread along the cable trays 
(horizontally and/or vertically). 
 Almost all small fires (< 1 GJ) are initiated at the cable trays that are close to the ceiling, 
whereas larger fires (> 1 GJ) are initiated at lower cable trays 
 The detection time of the small fires does not vary very much. The fires are initiated 
close to the ceiling. The detection time spread is much larger for the large fires and 
there is not so noticeable trend with respect to the z coordinate of the initial fire. 
 Previous results can be used to simplify the event tree based modelling of the cable 
room fire scenario. The small fires can be treated with a separate, very simple, event 
tree branch, because small fires do not produce damage to cables on the other 
redundancy group. The larger fires (> 1 GJ) are treated with a more complicated event 
tree model. The event tree of the large fires can be simplified by separating the 
detection time from the simulated fires. The detection time can be used as a 
distribution and not a part of the results of a specific fire simulation. 
In this report the analysis continues by studying the dependencies between the assumptions 
made for the fire brigade actions and the fire progression in the simulated fires, where the 
sprinkler system was failed. The main interest is on the fire-fighting conditions that were 
evaluated in the fire simulations.  
In the previous fire PRA analysis of the cable room fire scenario, the variables of interest were 
visibility, temperature and radiation at the doors of the room. For each variable and door, it 
was determined when the conditions became intolerable. However, the criteria for the 
firefighting conditions were taken at one level only (e.g., 1.5 m for visibility). This was an 
 
 





arbitrary choice and the sensitivity of the results of this choice is examined in Figures 3−5. 
Shown are the times when there is too much smoke (low visibility) at different doors at four 
different heights (h = 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0 m above floor). Only the large fires (burned fire load 
> 1 GJ) are considered, because smaller fires do not produce cable damage and they can be 
treated by a different event tree branch. It is seen that the height where the visibility is taken 
does not significantly affect the results. The results are also consistent. The conclusion is, that 
the old analysis was not sensitive with respect to the chosen details that were used to estimate 
the visibility at the different doors. This outcome may only be valid for the analysed fire 
scenario. For the large fires, the smoke layer starts to descend fast after a while and the 
visibility is lost quite rapidly at this point. 
  
  
Figure 3: Fire brigade conditions at door 1 (D1): visibility criterion at four different heights (h = 
0.5 m, 1.0 m, 1.5 m, 2.0 m). The height 0.5 m data is compared to other heights at the top 
and the times when visibility was lost in each simulation that produced “a large fire” are 



















































Figure 4: Fire brigade conditions at door 5 (D5): visibility criterion at four different heights (h = 
0.5 m, 1.0 m, 1.5 m, 2.0 m). The height 0.5 m data is compared to other heights at the top 
and the times when visibility was lost in each simulation that produced “a large fire” are 



















































Figure 5: Fire brigade conditions at door 6 (D6): visibility criterion at four different heights (h = 
0.5 m, 1.0 m, 1.5 m, 2.0 m). The height 0.5 m data is compared to other heights at the top 
and the times when visibility was lost in each simulation that produced “a large fire” are 
shown for each of the four heights at the bottom. 
The effect of the arriving time of the fire brigade to the outcome of the analysis can be examined 
by comparing the cable damage time with the time at which the visibility is lost. If the cable 
damage occurs typically before the time when the visibility is lost, the visibility does not change 
the ability of fire brigade to prevent the cable damage. The damage is already happened, when 
the visibility is lost. Thus, the visibility does not have any effect on the outcome of the analysis 
in this case. On the other case, i.e., cable damage occurs typically after the loss of visibility, 
the fire brigade should come before the loss of visibility in order to have some effect on the 

















































Typically, in the cable room fire simulations the cable damage occurs very close to the time 
when the visibility criterion for successful fire brigade operations is lost on the doors, but for 
some fires the damage occurs much later than the visibility criteria for fire brigade operations 
is exceeded. In short, there are only a few cases where the smoke can have some effect to 
the outcome of the analysis. Most of the cases are such that if the smoke hinders fire brigade 
operations, the cable damage is already (or at about same time) happened and fire brigade 
could not suppress the fire in time even without the smoke. This conclusion is not sensitive to 
the actual cable damage criterion, both 180 °C and 215 °C cable failure temperatures show 
very similar behaviour. The same is true for the chosen level (height above the floor), where 
the smoke criterion for fire brigade operations is taken. 
As can be seen in Figure 6, the cable failure time correlates strongly with the visibility criterion 
time of the fire brigade, especially for the door 1. For the other doors the correlation is not as 
strong, partly due to the fact that some of the other doors have only limited number of cases, 
where the smoke criterion is exceeded at all during the fire simulation. The general reason 
behind this correlation is physical. Fires that produce rapidly much smoke are typically also 
growing fast and, thus, able to damage cables fast. So there is a fundamental correlation 
between the smoke filling and cable damage times. 
As stated above, the fire PRA model of the studied cable room fire scenario is not sensitive to 
the assumptions made for the operations of the fire brigade with respect to the conditions 
(smoke) in the room of fire origin. Partly this is due to the fact that typically the cable failure 
occurs at about the same time as conditions become unfeasible for the fire brigade to operate. 
Partly it is due to the fact, that the time that it takes for the fire brigade to be ready for its actions 
(be at the scene, voltage shut down, etc.), the cable failure has typically already occurred. This 
is partly due to the properties of the studied fire scenario, i.e. that the time when the visibility 
is lost at the doors is not sensitive to the details of how this visibility criteria is calculated. In 
Table 1 ‒ Table 3 the distribution characteristics of the moments of loss of visibility are given 
for the doors 1, 5, and 6, respectively. It can be seen that the height above the floor, where the 
visibility information is taken, does not affect the distributions significantly. 
Table 1: Parameters of the “visibility lost” time distribution at the door 1 for four different 
heights above the floor. 
Door 1  h=0.5 m h=1.0 m h=1.5 m h=2.0 m 
ave 1440 1391 1356 1337 
median 1438 1391 1345 1336 
stddev 162 164 162 166 
min 1156 1116 1058 1050 
max 1908 1900 1788 1805 
 
Table 2: Parameters of the “visibility lost” time distribution at the door 5 for four different 
heights above the floor. 
Door 5  h=0.5 m h=1.0 m h=1.5 m h=2.0 m 
ave 1554 1501 1459 1421 
median 1495 1463 1422 1377 
stddev 281 249 223 223 
min 1155 1131 1103 1074 











Figure 6: Fire brigade visibility criterion at door 1 vs. cable damage time. Top: visibility 
criterion at different heights (h = 0.5 m, 1.0 m, 1.5 m, 2.0 m) is compared to damage time. 
Bottom: The visibility criterion (h = 1.0 m, 2.0 m) and damage (180 °C and 215 °C damage 
temperatures) times in each simulation that produced “a large fire”. 
The ability of the fire brigade to operate in the room depends also on the room temperature. In 
the earlier analysis by Hostikka et al. (2012a) a temperature limit of 100 °C was used at the 
doors as the criterion to decide, if the fire brigade will try to enter the fire room. The times of 
exceeding 100 °C at the door 1 are compared to the cable failure times in Figure 7 and Figure 
8. It can be seen that in this case the temperature is not a problem for fire brigade operations. 
For the other doors the temperature criterion is only exceeded in few simulations. It can be 
seen that the temperature criterion for fire brigade operations is sensitive to the height, where 
the temperature value is taken. But this sensitivity does not show in the results of the event 
tree analysis, because the visibility criterion is exceeded earlier than the temperature criterion, 
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failure has already happened when the temperature criterion is exceeded, i.e., cables are 
damaged before it is too hot for fire brigade to operate. 
 
Table 3: Parameters of the “visibility lost” time distribution at the door 6 for four different 
heights above the floor. 
Door 6  h=0.5 m h=1.0 m h=1.5 m h=2.0 m 
ave 1374 1342 1320 1270 
median 1356 1321 1312 1273 
stddev 204 198 194 171 
min 1060 1043 1001 926 
max 2320 2244 2165 1858 
 
 
As noted above, the temperature criterion for fire brigade operations is sensitive on how it is 
defined. Above a 100 °C temperature limit at different heights above the floor was examined. 
This is not an exact temperature limit, it is just an expert judgement. In actual situations the fire 
brigade does not measure the temperature exactly, but estimates the ability to enter the room 
otherwise. But if the temperature is about at this range, the thermal environment in the room 
is too hot for the fire brigade.  
The effect of this somewhat arbitrary temperature threshold value choice is examined using 
three different values (80/100/120 °C) as the threshold temperature in Figure 9 and Figure 10, 
where the time distributions are shown for door 6 at two different heights above the floor (0.5 
m and 1.5 m). 
 
It can be seen that the time when the temperature criterion for fire brigade operations is 
exceeded is sensitive to how this criterion is defined. This is a natural feature that is due to the 
properties of the considered fire scenario. The space is quite air tight and the fire is mainly 
getting the needed fresh air from the ventilation system. Thus, the maximum heat release rates 
of the fires are not very high and the gas temperature in the room stays at moderate levels. 
Because these heavily under ventilated fires do not reach fully developed room fire conditions 
(flashover), also the fire brigade temperature criterion is sensitive to the level of the measuring 
point (height above the floor). 
These sensitivities do not matter in this application of fire PRA method for the studied cable 
room fire scenario. The temperature criterion for fire brigade operations is exceeded in later 
stages of the fires when the cable failure has already happened and, thus, temperature has no 
impact on the fire brigade’s ability to suppress the fire before cable failure. Also the same 
reasons that were stated above for the smoke criterion apply here, e.g., typically fire brigade 
is ready for action too late to prevent the cable failure anyhow. 
 
 






Figure 7: Damage time (cable failure at 215 °C) vs. “too hot for fire brigade” (100 °C) time at 
door 1 at four different heights above the floor. 
 
Figure 8: Damage times (both 180 °C and 215 °C failure temperatures) and “too hot for fire 
brigade” times (at two different heights above the floor) of the simulated large (> 1 GJ) fires at 
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Figure 9: Cumulative distribution function of the “too hot for the fire brigade” time using three 
different temperature limits at 0.5 m above the floor at the door 6.  
 
Figure 10: Cumulative distribution function of the “too hot for the fire brigade” time using 
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5. Uncertainties in the case study 
The case study includes a large number of uncertainties. Some are obvious, whereas some 
are not so easily identified nor measured. Some uncertainties have already been taken into 
account in the model as probability distributions, whereas some have not. There are 
uncertainties related to fire simulation parameters, interpretation of fire simulation results, the 
fire simulation model itself, computation methods, time delays of firefighting actions, etc. 
There are different types of uncertainties: parametric uncertainties, model uncertainties and 
completeness uncertainties. Uncertainties can also be categorised into epistemic and aleatory 
uncertainties (Jyrkama & Pandey 2016). Epistemic uncertainty is caused by lack of knowledge. 
Aleatory uncertainty is variability caused by inherent randomness of the system. For example, 
it is known that a toss of a coin can result in heads or tails with probability of 0.5, but it is 
uncertain which result is obtained by one toss. Aleatory uncertainty is naturally present in the 
system and cannot be reduced. 
In the following subsections, uncertainties related to different areas of the analysis are 
identified. The significances of the uncertainties to the results are also analysed according to 
possibilities. Uncertainties are categorised into four significance categories: large, medium, 
small and insignificant. It has to be noticed that this categorisation is rough, and it is difficult to 
compare significances of uncertainties of difference types. 
5.1 Fire simulation parameters 
Uncertain parameters in fire simulations are presented in Table 4. Most of the parameters 
represent epistemic uncertainty. Some parameters are assumed to be associated with both 
epistemic and aleatory uncertainty, so they belong to a mixed category. In (Boneham et al. 
2019), the maximum heat release rate has been classified as aleatory variable, but it is hard 
to believe that there would not be any epistemic uncertainty, i.e. that the triangular distribution 
would exactly represent the real variability of the parameter. Epistemic uncertainty should not 
be underestimated. Kloos et al. (2014) also list some fire simulation parameters with epistemic 
uncertainty that are partly same as here. 
The parameters have also been qualitatively categorised according to their significance. The 
categorisation is based on how much the parameters impact the cable failure time according 
to Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (Dodge 2008). The time of maximum heat release 
rate is the parameter that has largest impact on the cable failure time. The activation 
temperatures of the sensors and response time indexes of the automatic suppression system 
are insignificant for the results, because the automatic suppression system was always able 
to suppress the fire when it worked. 
The location of the initial fire was another parameter that was varied using uniform distributions. 
The location is associated with aleatory uncertainty, and the probability distribution of the 
location is associated with epistemic uncertainty. The location has medium significance to the 
results according to Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. The height of the initial fire has 











Table 4: Fire simulation parameters. 
Parameter Unit Distribution Significance Uncertainty 
type 
Maximum heat release rate of the 
initial fire 
kW Triangular(300,500,700) Small Mixed 
Time of maximum heat release rate s Triangular(900,1200,1500) Large Mixed 
Specific heat capacity of concrete kJ/kg*K Uniform(0.6,1) Small Epistemic 
Density of concrete kg/m^3 Uniform(2100,2500) Medium Epistemic 
Thermal conductivity of concrete W/m*K Uniform(1.4,1.8) Small Epistemic 
Thickness of cable sheath 1 mm Uniform(2.184,3.276) Medium Epistemic 
Thickness of cable sheath 2 mm Uniform(2.184,3.276) Medium Epistemic 
Thickness of cable insulation mm Uniform(2.56,3.84) Medium Epistemic 
Thermal conductivity coefficient of 
cable sheath material 
 
Triangular(0.7,1,1.3) Small Epistemic 
Response time index 1 (m*s)^1/2 Triangular(120,150,180) Insignificant Epistemic 
Response time index 2 (m*s)^1/2 Triangular(25,37.5,50) Insignificant Epistemic 
Activation temperature 1 Celsius Triangular(67,74,81) Insignificant Mixed 
Activation temperature 2 Celsius Triangular(50,57,64) Insignificant Mixed 
 
5.2 Interpretation of the fire simulation results 
The analysis includes parameters related to the interpretation of the fire simulation results, i.e. 
when the cable is considered to have failed and whether the fire brigade can enter the room. 
The parameters are presented in Table 5. Uncertainties related to these parameters have not 
been taken into account in the analysis, except that two separate values were used for cable 
failure temperature. Anyhow, some uncertainty is surely related to these parameters. There 
may be both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty. Cable failure temperature uncertainty is 
considered epistemic in (Boneham et al. 2019), but there could also be some variability, i.e. 
cable does not necessarily always fail in the same temperature. The critical height for safe and 
tolerable firefighting conditions depends on the firefighters, so that uncertainty could mostly be 
aleatory. However, the use of a constant height for the monitoring of the conditions in the 
simulation is a simplification and a source of uncertainty itself. 
All the uncertainties related to the parameters have little, if any, significance to the results. In 
only 2% of the fire simulations, cable failure temperature 180 °C was reached, but not 215 °C, 
and usually 215 °C was reached soon after 180 °C. For firefighting conditions before cable 
failure, mainly the visibility limit, that is used to represent the critical firefighting conditions, has 
some significance. The height at which the visibility is measured also has only little significance 
as analysed in Section 4. The firefighter may enter the room crawling, but the visibility at 0.5 
meters is usually lost quite soon (e.g. 1-2 minutes) after 1.5 meters as seen in Figure 3. 
Kloos et al. (2014) had a different approach to the cable failure criteria: the cable was 
considered failed if it was exposed to a specific temperature a specific time. For example, 40 
seconds in 180 °C would cause the failure, as well as 120 seconds in 170 °C. Probability 
 
 





distributions were also specified for the critical exposure times, and uncertainty analysis was 
performed. These type of criteria were preferred by Kloos et al. (2014) over simple temperature 
criterion, and it had a large impact on the results. Therefore, the uncertainty related to the cable 
failure criteria should not be underestimated. 
Table 5: Parameters used in interpretation of the fire simulation results. 
Parameter Unit Value Significance Uncertainty type 
Cable failure temperature °C Two options: 
180, 215 
Small Mixed 
Visibility limit for fire fighting m 1 Small Mixed 
Temperature limit for fire fighting °C 100 Small Mixed 
Radioactive heat flux limit for fire fighting kW/m^2 10 Insignificant Mixed 
Critical height for firefighting conditions m 1.5 Small Mixed 
 
5.3 Operation time model for firefighting 
The parameters of the operation time model are presented in Tables 6−13. There are two types 
of variables: time delays and probabilities. Uncertainties related to probabilities are epistemic. 
Time delays have typically both aleatory and epistemic uncertainty, because a specific action 
lasts different time on different trials, but the real probability distribution of the time delay is not 
known exactly. Aleatory and epistemic uncertainties have not been separated in the model. 
A couple of parameters do not have uncertainty distributions assigned to them, but it seems 
likely that there is anyway some uncertainty. Particularly, the time to the room entrance should 
have some aleatory uncertainty, because it is hard to believe that the walk would always take 
the same time. Furthermore, there should also be some epistemic uncertainty. The 
probabilities of road barrier and other alarm could also have some epistemic uncertainty, even 
if there is lots of data available about those. 
Table 6: Parameters of the detection model. 
Parameter Unit Distribution Significance Uncertainty 
type 
Automatic detection failure probability 
 
Uniform(0.001,0.02) Small Epistemic 
Probability of detection from another room 
 
Uniform(0.001,0.002) Small Epistemic 
Time of detection from another room min Uniform(1,15) Small Mixed 
Time of manual detection min Uniform(1,120) Small Mixed 









Table 7: Guard centre model parameters. 
Parameter Unit Distribution Significance Uncertainty 
type 
Auto-notification failure probability 
 
Uniform(0.01,0.05) Small Epistemic 
Probability of wrong address 
 
Uniform(0.01,0.05) Small Epistemic 
Probability of wrong interpretation of the 
alarm 
 
Uniform(0.01,0.05) Small Epistemic 
Time delay of making a collective alarm min Uniform(0.1,0.5) Small Mixed 
Time delay of calling the unit director min Uniform(1,1.5) Small Mixed 
Time delay caused by wrong address min Uniform(2,10) Small Mixed 
Time delay of alarm set-off min Uniform(0.5,5) Medium Mixed 
Time delay caused by wrong interpretation 
of the alarm 
min Uniform(1,10) Small Mixed 
Time delay of calling to the guard centre min Uniform(0.5,2) Small Mixed 
 
Table 8: Control room model parameters. 
Parameter Unit Distribution Significance Uncertainty 
type 
Probability of credibility gap 
 
Uniform(0.01,0.1) Small Epistemic 
Probability that voltage is not switched off 
 
Uniform(0.03,0.3) Small Epistemic 
Time delay of sending a person to ensure 
fire 
min Uniform(0.5,2) Small Mixed 
Time delay of collaboration min Uniform(1,10) Medium Mixed 
Time delay caused by credibility gap min Uniform(3,5) Small Mixed 
Time delay of switching off the voltage min Uniform(10,30) Small Mixed 
Time delay caused by failure to switch off 
the voltage 
min Uniform(10,30) Small Mixed 
 
Table 9: Fire confirmation model parameters. 
Parameter Unit Distribution Significance Uncertainty 
type 
Probability of choosing a wrong route 
 
Uniform(0.01,0.1) Small Epistemic 
Time delay of moving to the starting point min Uniform(0,15) Medium Mixed 
Time delay of walking to the room of origin min Uniform(2,3) Small Mixed 
Time delay of choosing a wrong route min Uniform(1,15) Small Mixed 
 
 






Table 10: Fire brigade response time model parameters. 
Parameter Unit Distribution Significance Uncertainty 
type 
Fire brigade response time min Gamma(2.82,0.27) Small Mixed 
Probability of wrong target 
 
Uniform(0.02,0.2) Small Epistemic 
Unavailability of crew 
 
Uniform(0.05,0.5) Small Epistemic 
Unavailability of equipment 
 
Uniform(0.01,0.1) Small Epistemic 








Time delay caused by wrong target min Uniform(2,4) Small Mixed 
Time delay caused by unavailable crew min Uniform(5,8) Small Mixed 
Time delay caused by unavailable 
equipment 
min Uniform(5,10) Small Mixed 
Time delay caused by route barrier min Uniform(5,10) Small Mixed 
Time delay caused by other alarm min Uniform(10,15) Small Mixed 
 
Table 11: Building entrance model parameters. 
Parameter Unit Distribution Significance Uncertainty 
type 
Probability of broken hose 
 
Uniform(0.02,0.1) Small Epistemic 
Probability of broken coupling 
 
Uniform(0.01,0.05) Small Epistemic 
Pump failure to start probability 
 
Uniform(0.01,0.05) Small Epistemic 
Time to the building entrance min Uniform(0.5,5) Small Mixed 
Time delay caused by broken hose min Uniform(2,4) Small Mixed 
Time delay caused by broken coupling min Uniform(2,4) Small Mixed 
Time delay caused by pump failure to start min Uniform(2,4) Small Mixed 
 
The significance of different uncertainties was analysed by sensitivity analysis, where the 
analysed parameter was set to the “best possible value”. If the cable failure probability 
decreased less than 1E-3, the uncertainty was assessed to have small significance. It can be 
seen from the results that individual parameters do not have much significance. Only four time 
delay parameters with large uncertainty are assessed to have medium significance. These 












Table 12: Fire brigade to the room model parameters. 
Parameter Unit Distribution Significance Uncertainty 
type 
Probability that keys are forgotten 
 
Uniform(0.02,0.2) Small Epistemic 
Probability that wedges are forgotten 
 
Uniform(0.02,0.2) Small Epistemic 
Probability of broken hose 
 
Uniform(0.05,0.3) Small Epistemic 
Time to the room entrance min 0.462 Small Mixed 
Time delay caused by forgotten keys min Uniform(3,6) Small Mixed 
Time delay caused by forgotten wedges min Uniform(1,2) Small Mixed 
Time delay caused by broken hose min Uniform(1,2) Small Mixed 
 
Table 13: Systematic search model parameters. 
Parameter Unit Distribution Significance Uncertainty 
type 
Probability that the thermal camera is 
forgotten 
 
Uniform(0.02,0.2) Small Epistemic 
Probability of pressure loss 
 
Uniform(0.05,0.3) Small Epistemic 
Probability of communication problem 
 
Uniform(0.05,0.3) Small Epistemic 
Time delay of systematic search min Uniform(0,7) Medium Mixed 
Time delay caused by forgotten camera min Uniform(0,3) Small Mixed 
Time delay caused by pressure loss min Uniform(1,5) Small Mixed 
Time delay caused by communication 
problem 
min Uniform(2,5) Small Mixed 
 
5.4 Other uncertainties 
The failure probability of the automatic suppression system is a very important parameter for 
the results and quite uncertain. A uniform distribution between 0.02 and 0.04 has been used 
for it so far, but it hardly represents the complete uncertainty of the probability and should be 
revised. Therefore, the reliability analysis of sprinkler systems will be studied in Section 6. 
Uncertainties related to the models and the completeness of the analysis are more difficult to 
assess. There is epistemic uncertainty with regard to the accuracy and correctness of the FDS 
model including the ventilation model, smoke detectors model, sprinklers model, material 
parameters, ignition and combustion model. Analysis of model uncertainty in the context of fire 
simulations has been studied in (Paudel & Hostikka 2019). There can also be uncertainty with 
 
 





regard to the FinPSA model and particularly the operation time model, e.g. concerning the 
completeness and correctness, but likely parameter uncertainties are more significant. 
There is finally uncertainty concerning how realistically FDS calculates the fire progression 
based on given input parameters. The coverage of the simulations is also one source of 
uncertainty. In FinPSA, the uncertainty related to 10000 simulation cycles is only small, 
because the result does not vary much between different trials. In fire simulations, only 100 
cycles were performed, but on the other hand, efficient Latin hypercube sampling was used. It 
is not known how much the accuracy would be improved, if the number of fire simulations was 
increased. 
5.5 Uncertainty analysis 
Comprehensive uncertainty analysis would require that quantitative distributions could be 
assigned to all significant uncertainties. Aleatory and epistemic uncertainties should also be 
represented by separate distributions, e.g. so that epistemic uncertainty distributions would be 
assigned to the parameters of aleatory uncertainty distributions. The reason for this is that the 
probability of the cable failure itself represents the aleatory uncertainty on the occurrence of 
the cable failure, and the uncertainty distribution of the probability should represent uncertainty 
due to lack of knowledge, i.e. epistemic uncertainty. For each variable, it should be analysed 
what is the uncertainty caused by lack of knowledge (epistemic) and what is the uncertainty 
caused by the randomness of the action or event (aleatory). The uncertainty analysis could 
e.g. be performed by sampling epistemic and aleatory variables in separate loops as presented 
in (Tyrväinen & Karanta 2019) and (Boneham et al. 2019). However, this type of functionality 
has not yet been implemented in FinPSA. 
6. Reliability of a sprinkler system 
It has not been a standard practise in fire PRA applications to conduct reliability analyses for 
sprinkler systems. Therefore, there are not much failure data available for sprinkler 
components. In fire PRA, very conservative failure probabilities are typically used for sprinkler 
systems. EPRI’s fire PRA guide (EPRI & U.S. NRC 2005) considers generic system level 
failure probabilities from 0.02 to 0.05 depending on the type of the system to be realistic. 
6.1 Literature 
According to Nieminen (2018) there are two different methods to assess the reliability of 
sprinkler systems: a system based method and a component based method. In the system 
based method, previous fire cases are studied from compiled databases and statistics for direct 
evaluation of the reliability of the entire sprinkler system. In the component based method a 
fault tree is formed for the hardware components, reliability estimates are determined for 
individual hardware components, and the probability of failure is calculated for the top event. 
Accident-based studies of non-nuclear applications have shown that the majority of failures 
are due to inadequate maintenance or human error (the system is turned off) and failures due 
to actually failed components are very rare (Hall 2013; Hall 2010; Nieminen 2018). Statistics 
based reliability assessments always consist of a number of different sprinkler systems, so the 
component-based method is better suited for a single site to assess the reliability of a specific 
sprinkler system. 
There have been some attempts on fault tree modelling of sprinkler systems (Nieminen 2018; 
Rönty et al. 2004), but the uncertainties seem to be very large in such analyses. Nieminen 
 
 





(2018) estimated a failure probability of 0.003-0.01 for a generic non-nuclear sprinkler system 
in his recent master’s thesis. The model includes failures of the general water pipe, check 
valve, wet alarm valve, electric pump, diesel pump, piping and sprinkler head. The failure 
probabilities of the components were collected from literature, and the whole range of available 
values was used in the uncertainty analysis. Mission time of three months was used for most 
components, because the system should be tested every three months. This is a conservative 
approach, since the system obviously does not need to work the whole testing interval. 
Possibility that too many sprinkler heads open causing ineffective fire suppression was also 
modelled. If there are too many opening sprinkler heads relative to the amount of water 
available, then the amount of water coming from a single sprinkler may not be sufficient to 
ensure effective fire control. 
Rönty et al. (2004) studied sprinkler system reliability with focus on nuclear power plant 
systems. Failure data from Finnish nuclear power plants was collected in that study, and failure 
rates/probabilities were estimated for different components. The data may be outdated now as 
at least Olkiluoto’s systems have been renewed, but there are no newer studies on nuclear 
power plants available. There are some sprinkler system data available from other domains, 
such as (Frank et al. 2013; Moinuddin & Thomas 2014), but mostly the data are very old and 
their applicability is difficult to judge. 
6.2 Fault tree example 
Here, we present a simplified fault tree analysis of a generic wet pipe sprinkler system. 
Components of the system include a check valve, a wet alarm valve, sprinkler heads and three 
pumps. One of the pumps is a motor-operated pump, and two of the pumps are diesel pumps. 
One of the pumps is required to start and supply water to the sprinklers if a fire occurs. 
It is assumed that only one sprinkler head is important for fire suppression. If it fails, the fire 
suppression fails. This is presumably a conservative assumption, because other sprinkler 
heads could possibly make up the failure of the nearest sprinkler head. 
The position of the check valve is assumed to be monitored, but the possibility that the 
monitoring fails is also modelled. 
Other components like pipes, water source and valves on water supply lines from the pumps 
to the sprinklers are left out of this analysis. It is assumed that severe failures of those 
components would likely be noticed soon, and the probabilities to fail during the fire event are 
small. 
The top fault tree for the sprinkler system is presented in Figure 11, and the fault trees of the 
pumps are presented in Figures 12−14. Pump 1 is the motor-operated pump. For the pumps, 
unavailability due to maintenance have been modelled in addition to pump failures. For the 
motor-operated pump, power supply failures have simply been modelled using a single basic 
event, even though the power supply system would require its own fault tree in reality. 
 
 






Figure 11: Fault tree for the sprinkler system. 
 
Figure 12: Fault tree for pump 1. 
 
Figure 13: Fault tree for pump 2. 
 
 






Figure 14: Fault tree for pump 3. 
The failure rates and probabilities used in the analysis are presented in Table 14. They have 
been taken from several different sources. Typically, conservative 95th percentile values have 
been selected. The failure rates of the pumps are generic values from T-Book (TUD Office 
2015). The probabilities of maintenance and power supply failure basic events are made up, 
but the order of magnitude is realistic. 
Table 14: Failure rates and probabilities of the basic events. 
Name Comment Fr Probability Source 
CHEVAL_SCS Sprinkler check valve fails to remain open in standby 1.01E-8 1.09E-5 NRC 2016b 
DPUMP2_FTR Diesel pump fails to run 5.50E-3 5.48E-3 T-Book 
DPUMP2_FTS Diesel pump fails to start 9.80E-5 3.40E-2 T-Book 
DPUMP2_MAI Diesel pump under maintenance 0 1.00E-2 
 
DPUMP3_FTR Diesel pump fails to run 5.50E-3 5.48E-3 T-Book 
DPUMP3_FTS Diesel pump fails to start 9.80E-5 3.40E-2 T-Book 
DPUMP3_MAI Diesel pump under maintenance 0 1.00E-2 
 
MPUMP1_FTR Motor pump fails to run 1.35E-3 1.35E-3 T-Book 
MPUMP1_FTS Motor pump fails to start 2.03E-5 6.85E-3 T-Book 
MPUMP1_MAI Motor pump under maintenance 0 1.00E-2 
 
MPUMP1_PSF Power supply to motor pump fails 0 1.00E-3 
 
SPHEAD_FOD Sprinkler head fails 1.22E-7 4.10E-5 Rönty 2004 
VALMON_FTD Monitoring of the sprinkler check valve fails 0 7.02E-2 Moinuddin 2014 
WALVAL_FTO Wet alarm valve does not open 2.28E-7 7.68E-5 Rönty 2004 
 
For the wet alarm valve, the failure rate is taken from Finnish non-nuclear statistics (Rönty et 
al. 2004), even though there is some nuclear-specific data available in the same reference. 
The choice was made, because the data from nuclear domain is scarce, and non-critical 
failures are included in the data. With this value, the results are more balanced, but it has to 
be noticed that e.g. for Loviisa turbine hall ceiling protection system, a much larger failure rate 
has been estimated (Rönty et al. 2004). 
For the sprinkler head, the failure rate was taken from old Olkiluoto data counting both critical 
and “consequentially critical” failures (Rönty et al. 2004). The failure rate of the check valve 
was taken from NRC’s database. Much larger values can also be found from sprinkler related 
literature, but larger values seem somewhat questionable, since e.g. in (Nieminen 2018), it is 









A testing interval of a month is applied to most of the components. For the check valve, the 
testing interval is three months. Mission time of an hour is used for the pumps. It is a 
conservative value as the fire typically lasts a shorter time when the sprinkler system works. 
A common cause failure (CCF) for failure to run events of the diesel pumps is modelled with 
conservative 95th percentile beta-factor value from (NRC 2016a). The value is based on motor-
operated pumps, because data for diesel pumps were not available. A CCF is not modelled 
for failure to start events, because the probability of a single failure is itself larger than the beta-
factor would be. 
The top event probability is 1.64E-4. The most important minimal cut sets are the following: 
  Num Freq. Cumul Name  Comment  
    1 7.66E-05 46.66 WALVAL_FTO  Wet alarm valve does not open 
    2 4.10E-05 71.62 SPHEAD_FOD  Sprinkler head fails 
    3 1.15E-05 78.66 DPUMP2_FTS  Diesel pump fails to start 
   DPUMP3_FTS  Diesel pump fails to start 
   MPUMP1_MAI  Motor pump under maintenance 
    4 7.91E-06 83.47 DPUMP2_FTS  Diesel pump fails to start 
   DPUMP3_FTS  Diesel pump fails to start 
   MPUMP1_FTS  Motor pump fails to start 
    5 4.60E-06 86.28 DPUMPX_FTR-AB 2x CCF Diesel pumps fail to run 
   MPUMP1_MAI  Motor pump under maintenance 
    6 3.15E-06 88.20 DPUMPX_FTR-AB 2x CCF Diesel pumps fail to run 
   MPUMP1_FTS  Motor pump fails to start 
    7 2.33E-06 89.61 DPUMP2_MAI  Diesel pump under maintenance 
   DPUMP3_FTS  Diesel pump fails to start 
   MPUMP1_FTS  Motor pump fails to start 
    8 2.33E-06 91.03 DPUMP2_FTS  Diesel pump fails to start 
   DPUMP3_MAI  Diesel pump under maintenance 
   MPUMP1_FTS  Motor pump fails to start 
    9 1.86E-06 92.17 DPUMP2_FTS  Diesel pump fails to start 
   DPUMP3_FTR  Diesel pump fails to run 
   MPUMP1_MAI  Motor pump under maintenance 
   10 1.86E-06 93.30 DPUMP2_FTR  Diesel pump fails to run 
   DPUMP3_FTS  Diesel pump fails to start 
   MPUMP1_MAI  Motor pump under maintenance 
The failure of the wet alarm valve is the most important event of the model, but also pump 
failures and sprinkler head failure contribute significantly to the total result. The check valve is 
not important, because of the smaller failure probability and monitoring. 
 
 





The total probability is very small compared to the values used in the fire PRA model and some 
values in the literature, but uncertainties are large. It can mainly be concluded that the risk 
related to pump failures is small, if there are three pumps and one of the pumps is of different 
type. For the pumps, there are sufficient data available, and conservative 95th percentile values 
were used. On the other hand, the failure probabilities of the sprinkler head and wet alarm 
valve are quite uncertain, as also larger values can be found from literature. If the value 
estimated for a wet alarm valve in Loviisa turbine hall ceiling protection system in (Rönty et al. 
2004) was used, the failure probability of the wet alarm valve would be 3.5E-3 and it would 
completely dominate the result. 
Collection of sufficient amount of failure data for sprinkler system components is necessary for 
credible reliability analysis. It is important to separate different failure modes and impacts. 
Particularly critical failures need to be separated from failures that do not prevent the fire 
suppression as recognized by Rönty et al. (2004). 
The completeness of the analysis is important to evaluate. Some sprinkler system failure 
studies indicate that minority of failures to suppress are caused by component failures 
(Nieminen 2008). Common reasons for failures include that system was shutdown, design 
fault, lack of maintenance and manual intervention. It can be expected that in a nuclear power 
plant environment such faults would be less likely, but still those should not be ruled out without 
sufficient consideration. Probabilities of such failures are, of course, difficult to estimate, unless 
some general sprinkler system statistics are used. 
7. New modelling issues 
The purpose of this section is to consider fire PRA modelling issues that do not appear in the 
original cable fire case study. Some modelling issues are identified from literature and some 
based on general knowledge on fire modelling problems. It is considered how different 
modelling issues could be incorporated into the analysis. 
7.1 Multiple cable failures 
It is fairly common to study multiple consequences in fire PRA, e.g. failures of different cables 
in the same room. For example, Boneham et al. (2019) present a study with multiple cable 
trays, which is quite comparable to our case study. Different cable failures can simply be 
modelled as different end states of the event tree. Cases with only one cable failure, failure of 
all cables in the room and combinations of cable failures can be modelled as separate event 
tree sequences. 
Fire simulations need to produce failure times for all target cables, and those can be imported 
to FinPSA as vectors in the same way as in the case of one target. The event tree can be 
constructed e.g. as in Figure 15 so that different consequences have separate branches in the 
last section of the event tree. When calculating the failure probabilities, one has to remember 
that the cable failure times of different cables are dependent, i.e. they cannot be treated 
independently. Because of this, it is convenient to handle different cables in the same event 
tree section. The programming can then be performed as in the following scripts (find the 
original scripts in (Tyrväinen et al. 2020)). 
 
 






Figure 15: Event tree with two target cables. 
function real AllFail 
  i = 1 
  c = 0 
   
  while lesse(i,NumSim) do 
  begin 
    if lesse(BadConditions(i),t_oper-t_ss) then 
    begin 
      $ Not possible to enter the room due to intolerable conditions 
      c = c+1 
    end 
    else if lesse(DamageTime1(i),t_oper) then 
    begin 
      if lesse(DamageTime2(i),t_oper) then c = c+1 
    end 
    i = i+1 
  end 
 
  $ Probability of cable failure 
  p_all = c/NumSim 
 
  Damage1 = true 




function real C1Fail 
  i = 1 
  c = 0 
   
  while lesse(i,NumSim) do 
  begin 
    if more(BadConditions(i),t_oper-t_ss) then 
    begin 
      if lesse(DamageTime1(i),t_oper) then 
      begin 
        if more(DamageTime2(i),t_oper) then c = c+1 
      end 
    end 
    i = i+1 
  end 
 
  $ Probability of cable failure 
  p_1 = c/NumSim 
 
  Damage1 = true 




function real C2Fail 
  i = 1 
  c = 0 
   
 
 





  while lesse(i,NumSim) do 
  begin 
    if more(BadConditions(i),t_oper-t_ss) then 
    begin 
      if lesse(DamageTime2(i),t_oper) then 
      begin 
        if more(DamageTime1(i),t_oper) then c = c+1 
      end 
    end 
    i = i+1 
  end 
 
  $ Probability of cable failure 
  p_2 = c/NumSim 
 
  Damage1 = false 
  Damage2 = true 
return p_2 
If the order of cable failures is important for functioning/failure of the corresponding safety 
functions, that is also simple to take into account with a couple of changes to the scripts.  
7.2 Fire spreading outside the room 
Fire spreading outside the room is one consequence of interest related to the cable room fire 
case study. The performance of the fire compartmentation of the cable room was studied in 
(Paajanen & Kling 2013) by continuing the simulations of (Hostikka et al. 2012a) for an 
extended period of time to determine the four-hour exposure. From the simulations, it was 
concluded that in this kind of environment, it would take several hours for the thermal exposure 
to reach the followed fire barriers. Beyond this, there is a risk of fire spreading if a door of the 
room is open or not intact. Through an open door, the fire also receives oxygen, which could 
also affect the fire and make it much worse. 
In the FinPSA model, the event tree could have separate branches for the cases where the 
door is open. It could be asked in the beginning of the event tree or after the automatic 
suppression system failure, depending on whether it affects the success of the suppression 
system. Separate fire simulations would then be required for the open door case, and the 
probability of open door should be estimated. 
Modelling of fire spreading would require some more information from fire simulations. For 
each fire simulation, it should be determined whether the fire spreads outside the room or a 
probability for that should be estimated. This could e.g. mean comparison of the thermal 
exposure of a fire barrier to the strength of the fire barrier. The analysis could be done either 
in background calculations or inside the FinPSA model if sufficient information about fire and 
structures were imported to the model. Also, if background calculations were used, the results 
of those should be imported to the FinPSA model. Fire spreading could be modelled with an 
additional event tree section after the cable failure consideration. The dependency between 
the cable failure and fire spreading should however be taken into account in the calculations, 
because the model would include such consequences as “cable failure with fire spreading”, 
“cable failure without fire spreading” and “fire spreading without cable failure”. 
7.3 Multiple fire brigades 
Kloos et al. (2014) have modelled a pump lubrication oil fire in NPP using a dynamic event 
tree. Cable failure is also analysed in this study, and the study is comparable to our study. A 
particularly interesting aspect of that study is that the fire can be suppressed by a fire patrol or 
a fire brigade. If two out of three detectors detect the fire, both the fire patrol and fire brigade 
are alarmed immediately. If only one detector detects the fire, the fire patrol inspects the 
compartment. The fire patrol always arrives first to the compartment, but the fire patrol does 
not wear personal protective equipment and is not able to extinguish all fires. 
 
 





To model similar case with our method, the operation times of both the fire patrol and fire 
brigade would need to be considered. This would be easy to model given sufficient information 
about the time delays. The fire patrol is likely to correspond to the person who confirms the fire 
in the cable room fire case. Therefore, the fire extinguishing would be the only new part in the 
model. It would then need to be considered what the conditions for successful firefighting of 
the fire patrol are, and how long time the extinguishing would take. The modelling of the 
success/failure could be performed simply by adding a couple of new if-clauses to the scripts. 
It might also require some more elaboration of fire simulation data concerning when conditions 
become intolerable for the fire patrol. 
If a very large fire would occur, several fire brigades could be needed to suppress the fire. 
Hostikka et al. (2012b) and Kling et al. (2013) have studied a tank wagon fire, where the goal 
was to assess the possibility of the fire brigade to get the situation under control in case of a 
major fire of flammable liquid leaking from a tank wagon in tunnel-like circumstances in a city 
centre. A successful suppression of major fires requires that there are enough resources (staff, 
equipment, water) in use and that the resources are available fast enough. The stochastic 
operation time modelling was used to study how long it takes that the suppression and cooling 
resources are available. The result of the simulation was the chronological distribution of the 
operational readiness of water cannons. The planned deck structure was located in the so-
called first risk area; so the first rescue unit has to reach the target within six minutes of an 
alarm as a rule and an attempt is made to get the rescue team to the target within 20 minutes. 
An extended alarm will be given to the rescue platoon or company if it appears that the rescue 
unit is not enough for the task (Figure 16).  
Because the objective was the simulation of the accumulating resources and because the 
critical resources were the water cannons, each water cannon was processed as a separate 
actor, who has its own timeline. The resulting distributions of water cannon arrival times are 
presented in Figure 17. This type of simulation of arrival times of multiple water cannons could 
well be implemented in FinPSA scripts and included in a fire PRA model. The time when a 
certain number of water cannons have arrived could be determined in the simulations to 
determine when a certain suppression level can be attained. Impact of a certain number of 
water cannons on the fire progression would require corresponding fire simulations. The 
simulations are also needed to determine how many water cannons are needed to control that 
fire. However, even a smaller number of water cannons can be used for cooling and preventing 
the fire from spreading. To model that kind of impact in the fire PRA model would likely require 










Figure 16. A diagram describing a situation of a major fire, where only one team is initially 
alerted to the target, but the alarm is later extended to the company plus tank trucks, a 
dangerous goods container and a high-power pump. 
 
Figure 17. The resulting distributions of water cannon arrival times. 
 
 





8. Summary and conclusions 
Simulation-based event trees of FinPSA have previously mainly been applied to level 2 PRA, 
but as the method is more generally applicable, they are used to model fire scenarios in this 
task. The work was started, in 2019, by implementing a previous case study concerning 
simulation of fire behaviour and human operations in Olkiluoto cable room fire scenario in 
FinPSA. Originally, the analyses were performed by Monte Carlo simulations that combined 
fire simulations by FDS (McGrattan, 2013) and stochastic operation time simulations of 
firefighting operations. The purpose was to study the possibilities to prevent the consequences 
of a fire, before components start to fail causing failure of safety systems. In 2019, the same 
scenario was modelled using FinPSA, which proved to be an excellent tool for this purpose.  
During 2020, we continued the case study and focused on the following topics: 
 Dependencies between fire brigade actions and fire progression 
 Reliability analysis of sprinkler systems 
 Identification of uncertainties 
 Extending the approach to a wider range of fire scenarios 
Dependencies between fire brigade actions and fire progression have been explored further. 
Fire brigade may not be able to enter the room because of lost visibility or too high temperature. 
However, the visibility has only small impact on the cable failure probability, and the model is 
not sensitive to the assumptions made about the visibility. The time when the temperature 
becomes too high for fire brigade is quite sensitive to assumptions, but the cable has already 
failed at that point anyway. No needs to change the fire PRA model were identified based on 
the analysis. 
A large number of uncertainties were identified for the cable room fire PRA study. The 
uncertainties were related to fire simulation parameters, interpretation of fire simulation results, 
fire simulation model itself, computation methods, time delays of firefighting actions and 
reliability of the automatic suppression system. The significances of different uncertainties 
were assessed according to possibilities. Most of the uncertainties were assessed to have a 
small significance for the results. The most significant uncertainties are related to some fire 
simulation parameters (particularly time of maximum heat release rate), reliability of the 
automatic suppression system and some central firefighting actions. Uncertainties related to 
the fire simulation model, its completeness and the computation methods may also be 
significant, but they are difficult to analyse. All in all, uncertainty analysis is a challenging, but 
important area that requires further considerations. 
Reliability analysis of sprinkler systems was studied by reviewing previous analyses found in 
the literature and conducting a simplified fault tree analysis for a generic wet pipe system. Such 
reliability analyses have been quite rare or at least not published, and data related to sprinkler 
component failures are scarce. The fault tree analysis showed that the probability of 
simultaneous failure of three fire water pumps is small, but sprinkler components, such as wet 
alarm valve, can have larger failure probabilities. Collection of sufficient amount of failure data 
for sprinkler system components is necessary for credible reliability analysis. In additions, other 
types of failures, like manual intervention, design fault, and system being shutdown, should 
not be overlooked as those are quite common reasons for sprinkler system failures. 
Some new modelling issues were considered from the point of view of FinPSA modelling. 
Modelling of multiple consequences, such as multiple cable failures, is relatively 
straightforward as demonstrated by a simple modelling example. Multiple fire brigades could 
also well be incorporated to the operation time model given that sufficient information about 
 
 





time delays exist. In addition, fire spreading outside the room could be included in the analysis, 
though it would require some more research to develop the detailed modelling approach. 
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